Suchergebnisse

Preface to the new edition -- Preface -- Introduction: Cultures of objectivity -- Power in numbers: A world of artifice ; How social numbers are made valid ; Economic measurement and the values of science ; The political philosophy of quantification -- Technologies of trust: Experts against objectivity : accountants and actuaries ; French State engineers and the ambiguities of technocracy ; U.S. Army Engineers and the rise of cost-benefit analysis -- Political and scientific communities: Objectivity and the politics of disciplines ; Is science made by communities?

This volume provides a history of the concepts, practices, institutions, and ideologies of social sciences (including behavioural and economic sciences) since the eighteenth century. It offers original, synthetic accounts of the historical development of social knowledge, including its philosophical assumptions, its social and intellectual organization, and its relations to science, medicine, politics, bureaucracy, philosophy, religion, and the professions. Its forty-two chapters include inquiries into the genres and traditions that formed social science, the careers of the main social disciplines (psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, political science, geography, history, and statistics), and international essays on social science in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It also includes essays that examine the involvement of the social sciences in government, business, education, culture, and social policy. This is a broad cultural history of social science, which analyzes from a variety of perspectives its participation in the making of the modern world

The struggle over cure rate measures in nineteenth-century asylums provides an exemplary instance of how, when used for official assessments of institutions, these numbers become sites of contestation. The evasion of goals and corruption of measures tends to make these numbers "funny" in the sense of becoming dishonest, while the mismatch between boring, technical appearances and cunning backstage manipulations supplies dark humor. The dangers are evident in recent efforts to decentralize the functions of governments and corporations using incentives based on quantified targets. ; publishedVersion ; Culture Unbound is an Open Access journal, (CC BY-NC)

Is intelligence a fit topic for intellectual history? The creation and institutionalization of IQ (the initials have become self-sufficient, and no longer stand for "intelligence quotient") have been a favorite topic in the history of psychology, and have even achieved some standing in social histories of class, race, and mobility, especially in the United States. The campaign to quantify intelligence tended to remove it from the domain of intellectual history, which after all has traditionally emphasized ideas and interpretations. Measurement, and not alone of the mind, was pursued as a way to rein in the intellect by making it more rigorous. What was pushed out the door, however, returned through the window in the form of debates about what intelligence means; in what sense and with what tools it can be measured; and how these measures relate to other ways of comprehending mind, thought, and reason. Quantification, a potent strategy for releasing science from the grip of history, is itself profoundly historical, as a half-century of modern scholarship has demonstrated. This historicizing of the antihistorical embodies what we may call counterreflexivity, and, as such, is partly about puncturing illusions, though it need not take a negative view of the social role of science. The perspective of history is all the more essential because the depoliticization of merit through science entails a consequential moral and political choice. Measurement, by rationalizing and stabilizing the idea of intelligence, enabled it more readily to enter everyday discourse and to be put to work in schools, businesses, and bureaucracies.

It is an unusual and memorable privilege to address so international a gathering here in North Carolina on the Fourth of July. American nationalism in recent times has not been very broad-minded, and I'm envious of a society that can attract so many participants from all over the world. But the issue of cosmopolitanism and parochialism pertains to academic discipline as well as to nationality. Historians and economists do not always understand one another very well, and while economists are able to bring in bigger incomes and to maintain a higher public profile, historians maintain a certain authority in regard to scholarly writing about the past. Practitioners of history of economics have often been upbraided for failing to write "real" history, and I have been known to write in this vein. At least I am among those who have tried to persuade members of this society of the merits of history, history of science, and science studies as models for writing history of economics. At the same time I have been seduced by the fascination of this field to devote much of my own research to it, and in these efforts I have come to admire and to draw inspiration from what is distinctive in historical writing on economics, as well as what seems most familiar from the standpoint of the historical discipline.